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1. INTRODUCTION
Existence and relevance of the externalities associated with investments
in human capital have been an important topic of research in the last
twenty years, mostly (but not exclusively) in connection with growth the-
ory. Among the attempts to provide a microeconomic foundation for the
existence of increasing returns to the investments in human capital is Ace-
moglu (1996). His paper considers a parametric (Cobb-Douglas production
function and quasi-linear utility function) model where rms and workers
invest in physical and human capital in an environment characterized by
the lack of perfect competition in the labor markets (rms and workers
are paid an exogenously given share of the total output) and impossibility
to sign, before the investments take place, binding contracts. Equilibria
of the model exhibit a pecuniary externality, because an increase in rms
and workersinvestments is unambiguously Pareto improving. An impor-
tant policy implication is that subsidies to the investments of any subset
of workers are Pareto improving.
The purpose of our paper is to extend the analysis to a similar (para-
metric) set-up where, however, rms and workers choose both the amount
and the type of their investments. We consider a two-sector model (à la Roy
(1951)). Firms are ex-ante identical, while workers are heterogeneous, be-
cause they di¤er in a parameter determining the marginal disutility of their
investments in human capital. By choosing a particular type of investment,
and paying a xed cost, agents self-select into the associated industrial sec-
tor. Production requires sector-specic labor and capital and is obtained
after a random match worker-rm. We do not analyze in detail the in-
vestments in education. We simply assume that there are two di¤erent
kinds of (instantaneous) education (for instance, high school and college).
One (costlier) allows to enter the more productive sector of the economy
(the one with the higher total factor productivity, TFP). After agents have
selected the type of education, they still have to decide how much e¤ort
to devote to it. E¤ort in education translates one-to-one into additional
units of human capital. An alternative, and equivalent, interpretation of
the model is that workers simply have an elastic labor supply and that
their investments in education determine the type of labor (economist vs.
bricklayer) they can supply. We study and compare the properties of the
equilibria in the Walrasian economy and in an economy with labor market
frictions. The essential feature of the economy is that the match worker-
rm takes place after their investments. However, to facilitate comparison
with the results of Acemoglu (1996), we also assume that labor markets are
non-competitive. We are mostly interested in the ine¢ ciency properties of
equilibria. Equilibria in the economy with frictions are evidently Pareto
ine¢ cient (but not Pareto inferior to the ones of the Walrasian economy).
More relevant, they are also constrained Pareto ine¢ cient when we dene
the constraints in the planners problem (maximization of the condition-
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ally expected total surplus) so to mimic the imperfections of the markets.
There are two distinct externalities at work in our economy. The rst is
basically the one pointed out in Acemoglu (1996): Given the threshold 
dening the partition of the agents into the two sectors, an increase in the
investments in human and physical capital is Pareto improving. Also, given
; if some workers increase their investments, this translates into a benet
for all the workers and the rms. However, and this is the second source of
externalities, changes in the value of  also have an impact on social wel-
fare, because, in an environment with heterogeneous workers, they modify
the (conditionally) expected behavior of the two sets of agents. This is a
general property of two-sector economies with market imperfections. In
the analysis of investments in human capital, the "composition e¤ect" as
a source of externalities has been rst studied by Charlot and Decreuse
(2005, see also Charlot, Decreuse, and Granier (2005)) in a random match-
ing, two-sector economy. A fairly general extension of their analysis is in
Mendolicchio, Paolini, and Pietra (2008). In these papers, however, the
supply of human (and physical capital) is perfectly inelastic.
In the environment considered here, it can be Pareto improving to in-
crease the value of  (i.e., to shrink the set of workers active in the high pro-
ductivity sector). The intuition behind this result is fairly simple. Firms
investments in sector s are chosen (before matches take place) considering
the conditional expectation of the amount of human capital of the workers
active in s. Under our assumptions, workers with high marginal disutil-
ity of the investment are active in the low TFP sector. To increase 
means to shift some workers from the high to the low TFP sector. These
individuals are the ones with the lowest amount of human capital in the
high TFP sector, but they become the ones with the highest amount in
the low TFP sector. Hence, an increase in  induces, simultaneously, an
increase in the conditional expectation of the amount of human capital in
both sectors. This pushes up the investments in physical capital, which,
in turn, stimulate investments in human capital in both sectors. At the
equilibrium, given that expected producers surpluses in the two sectors
are strictly positive, this mechanism does not necessarily imply (modulo
an income redistribution) a Pareto improvement. We show that it does
when the TFPs are su¢ ciently di¤erent. Subsidies to the amount of edu-
cational investments have two e¤ects: a (always benecial) direct one and
an indirect one, because of their e¤ect on the threshold value :When the
di¤erence in TFPs is su¢ ciently large, it turns out that both e¤ects are
(modulo a redistribution) Pareto improving in the case of subsidies to the
amount of educational investment in the low TFP sector, while they push
in opposite directions in the case of subsidies in the high TFP sector.
If we interpret the structure of the model in terms of college vs. high
school education, the main policy implication is that, when the di¤erence in
TFP is large, subsidies to investments in education should be concentrated
on high school students, where they are unambiguously Pareto improving.
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Alternatively, subsidies to the investment e¤ort in higher education should
go together with su¢ ciently high xed tuitions, so to avoid the Pareto
worsening e¤ect due to the adverse "composition e¤ect".
There is a large literature on subsidies to education (for an overview,
see Carneiro and Heckman (2003)). In our set-up, subsidies are motivated
exclusively by e¢ ciency considerations in an environment where initial dis-
tribution of wealth is irrelevant, while labor market imperfections are the
key issue. On the contrary, in the literature, most commonly, subsidies to
education are considered in economies where imperfections in the nancial
markets are the key source of ine¢ ciency, so that the initial distribution
of wealth matters. See, for instance, Caucutt and Kumar (1999), Lewis
and Winston (1997), Dynarski (2003), and Charlot and Decreuse (2007)).
Closer to our perspective are several papers where the incentive e¤ects of
tuitions and subsidies to higher education are analyzed, see, for instance,
Blankenau (2004), Blankenau and Camera (2006, 2008), Sahin (2004), and
Su (2004). In particular, Sahin (2004) provides some empirical evidence
suggesting a "positive relationship between the total time spent on acad-
emic activities and the tuition paid by a student controlling for ability and
family income. Additionally, students in states with higher public tuition
do study harder". This appears to be consistent with our results related
to the composition e¤ect (see, also, Garibaldi et alii (2007)),.
The aim of our paper is primarily theoretical. However, it is worthwhile
to complement our analysis with a few, sketchy information about human
capital policies adopted in several countries. The rst thing that we can
observe is that, at least in OECD countries, total expenditures per student
are typically somewhat increasing in the level of education, and, in most
cases, the share of the total costs of education paid by private sources is also
increasing (see Table 1 below). However, as pointed out in OECD (2008),
about 3/4 of the public subsidies to households and other private entities
for educational purposes (in average 0.4% of the GDP in 2004) are aimed to
tertiary education, and they are about 18% of the total expenditure at this
level. The net result is that the actual private expenditure (net of subsidies)
in several OECD countries (and in the average) covers a percentage of
total costs of tertiary education which does not appear to be very di¤erent
from the percentage related to pre-tertiary education. The OECD (2008)
report indicates that the countries considered can be classied into four
groups. In particular, one group includes "Australia, New Zealand, the
UK, the US and the Netherlands, where there are potentially quite high
nancial barriers to entry tertiary-type A education, but also large public
subsidies are provided" (p. 238). On the contrary, in most of the countries
in continental Europe, there are low nancial barriers to entry and low
subsidies to tertiary education. Our theoretical results suggest that it would
be particularly hard to rationalize the "continental Europe" model in terms
of the incentives provided.
4
Table 1
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 discusses the
general features of the model. Section 3 and 4 discuss equilibria in the
benchmark, Walrasian, economy, and in the economy with imperfect labor
markets. Section 5 studies the properties in terms of welfare of the equi-
libria of the economy with frictions. Most of the proofs are in Appendix 1.
Appendix 2 establishes that qualitatively similar results hold for the econ-
omy where agents are paid their marginal products, as long as matches
take place after the investment decisions.
2. THE MODEL
The economy is composed by two separate production sectors, denoted
by s 2 fne; eg :Workers (denoted by a subscript i when we refer to individ-
uals, I when we refer to the set) and rms (denoted by j and J; respectively)
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can choose to enter one of the two sectors, paying a xed cost. Workers
costs, (cneI ; c
e
I) ; are exogenous, and can be interpreted as private, xed
costs of education (tuitions and the like). We denote rmscosts (dneJ ; d
e
J) :
They are endogenously determined, and will be discussed later on. There
are two intervals of equal length of workers, 
I = (0; 1) ; and rms, 
J ;









J ; respectively). At equilibrium, each interval is




eJg ; determined endoge-
nously. In sector s, production requires a rm j (with physical capital
ksj ) and a worker i (with stock of human capital h
s







eJg are given; each sector of the economy
reduces to the set-up studied in Acemoglu (1996). The only di¤erence is
that his analysis is mostly devoted to the case of homogeneous workers
and rms, while we (necessarily) always consider the case of heterogeneous
workers. Firms are identical, and choose their investments in physical cap-
ital to maximize their expected prots. Workers choose their investments
in human capital to maximize their expected utilities.
The economy lasts one period, divided in several subperiods. We con-
sider two versions of the basic model. In the frictionless (or Walrasian)
version, in subperiod zero, rms and workers enter (paying a xed cost)
one of the two sectors. In subperiod 1, each rm active in sector s is
matched with a worker active in the same sector (we will be more precise
on the matching issue later on) and rms and workers can sign binding
contracts on the amount of human and physical capital that they will sup-
ply. In subperiod 2, investments are carried out. In the nal subperiod, 3,
exchanges and production take place, and agents are paid on the basis of
their marginal product.
In the second version of the model, the total output of each match is
split according to the Nash bargaining solution with (exogenous) weights
 and (1  ) (for a rationalization of this allocation rule in this context,
see the Appendix in Acemoglu (1996)). Moreover, and most important,
agents cannot commit themselves to a given level of investment, because
investments are carried out before the matches. When workers are hetero-
geneous, the rst type of friction in the labor market has a very limited role
in determining the e¢ ciency properties of equilibria. The crucial feature
is that matches take place after the investments, so that rms and workers
cannot commit ex-ante to a given amount of them, and must base their
choices on the conditional expectation of the investments of the potential
future partners. Indeed, as long as random matches take place after the in-
vestments, the same qualitative results hold even if the spot labor markets
are perfectly competitive2 . This case is briey considered in Appendix 2.
To avoid additional complications (not really germane to the main issue
2 In Acemoglu (1996), the benchmark is an economy with identical workers and rms.
Evidently, in this case, if spot labor markets were competitive, we would end up with
the Pareto e¢ cient, complete markets allocation.
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analyzed here), we want to avoid to introduce the possibility of unemploy-
ment. This requires that, at equilibrium, each worker, and each rm, active
in a sector is actually matched with a partner. Technologies are described
by a pair of Cobb-Douglas production functions with constant returns to
scale. Therefore, in the Walrasian set-up, equilibrium prots are zero, en-




arbitrary. Therefore, we can set 
sJ = fj 2 
J jj = i; i 2 
sIg ; each s. On
the contrary, in the economy with frictions, the expected producers sur-
plus is positive in both sectors and, as we will show later on, larger in
sector e. We can obtain that the equilibrium value of 
J is indeterminate
(so that we can put 
sJ = fj 2 
J jj = i; i 2 
sIg ; each s) in at least two
alternative ways. First, we can assume that rms cannot move across sec-
tors. A non-null measure of rms is exogenously assigned to each sector.
The matching function guarantees that each rm is matched with a worker
(and+ conversely) for each non-trivial partition of the workers. As long as
there is a continuum of workers and rms in each sector, this can be done.
Of course, this approach would break down if we had a nite number of
agents and, anyhow, is based on a very ad hoc trick. A second approach
is to assume that the matching functions guarantee with probability one a
match to each agent, provided that  (
sI) =  (

s
J). Moreover, we need
to assume that the technology exploited in sector ne is free, while the one
adopted in sector e is protected by a patent, owned by some outside agent
(clearly, nothing would change if both technologies were subject to distinct
patents)3 . Rights to use the patent are auctioned o¤ to rms before the
match rm-worker obtains. Given that, at an equilibrium, expected prots
in both sectors must be identical, the equilibrium royalties (that we identify
with dJ) must be equal to the (positive) di¤erence between the expected
producers surpluses in the two sectors. It follows that, at each equilibrium,

pJ is essentially arbitrary. The property we are looking for.
Without any loss of generality, we can take the prices of both kinds of
output to be equal to 1 and, therefore, omit them.
Finally, notice that there are always two additional equilibria: the ones
where all the workers and the rms are in one of the two sectors. This
is because, evidently, if no rm is active in sector s, every worker moves
to the other sector (and conversely). As usual, we will ignore these trivial
equilibria.
3. THE FRICTIONLESS ECONOMY
When active in sector s; and matched with worker i with human capital







  Ashsi ks(1 )j ;
3Of course, any input used only in sector e and with perfectly inelastic supply would
do. We consider the case of a patent to simplify as much as possible the model.
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with Ae > Ane:
Let  be the unit price of physical capital, that we assume to be equal
in the two sectors. This implies some loss of generality, but allows for more
straightforward computations. Under suitable restrictions on the values of
As
s , similar results could be obtained for 
e 6= ne:
Given a match with worker i; rm j solves optimization problem
choose ksj 2 argmaxAshsi ks(1 )j   ksj   wijhsi ; (Ws)
where we omit the xed entry costs dsJ ; because, at equilibrium, they must
be zero.
For each individual, the utility function is







where Ci denotes consumption, while hsi is the amount of human capital.
Let csI be the (xed) cost of the investment in human capital. Then, in
the absence of taxes and subsidies, if the worker is active in sector s and






: Workers are heterogeneous be-
cause of the parameter i: Without any essential loss of generality, we
assume i = i; so that this parameter is uniformly distributed on (0; 1) :
To introduce more general assumptions on the distribution of i and its
support would introduce additional computational complexities without
changing the essential results.
Evidently, the equilibrium amount of agent is investment in human













where the superscriptW denotes the frictionless, Walrasian economy. Given
that, at the equilibrium, prots are always zero, there is no loss of general-
ity in assuming that rm j is always matched with worker i = j:With this













Lets now consider the equilibrium partition 
pI : For convenience, set
cneI = 0 and c
e





  Unei  HWne (i) ;KWne (i)  ceI ;
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i.e., by direct computation, if and only if
i  W (ceI) 
2664 (1 +  ) (1+ )(1 ) 
 
h











Hence, for ceI positive and su¢ ciently small, there is a unique threshold
value W (ceI) ; strictly increasing in c
e
I :

















4. THE ECONOMY WITH FRICTIONS
Given that matches take place after the investments are carries out,
agents choices must be based on the conditional expectations of the in-
vestment amounts of the (potential) partners.
Given any random variables xs and ys; with xs : 
sI ! R; and ys :
































J will be dened





) : We will use F to denote the equilibrium threshold
value, where the superscript F denotes the economy with frictions.
For future reference, lets determine the optimal amount of investments
assuming that they are subsidized. Let ts (h) be the subsidy to the amount
invested in human capital, zs (k) the one to the amount of the investment
in physical capital.














sI() (hsi ) k
s(1 )
j   ksj + zs
 
ksj
  dsJ : (Fs)
As mentioned before, we can interpret dsJ as royalties paid to access the
technologies used in the two sectors. At equilibrium, we set dneJ = 0 and
dsJ equal to the (positive, as we will see) di¤erence between the conditional
expected producers surpluses in the two sectors. Therefore, each rm
is indi¤erent between the two sectors (and has non-negative conditional
expected prots).
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stated functional form is obviously selected for computational convenience.
It could be, arbitrarily closely, approximated using a step-linear subsidy
schedule. Also for computational convenience, express the amount of the
subsidy as







i ) is the equilibrium value of E
sI() (h
s
i ) : To avoid
misunderstandings: In the sequel, we will consider equilibria associated
with  = 0; and study the e¤ects of the introduction of subsidies. Hence,
it is perfectly legitimate to consider  as an exogenous variable even if,
for the sake of computational easiness, we express it as a function of an
(endogenous) equilibrium value E
sI(F) (h
s) (or of some other target
level).



















ks(1 ). Using this fact, at the equilibrium, the optimization problem of













+ tshsi   csI ; (UFs)
where ts (hsi ) = t
shsi is the subsidy to amount of the investments in human
capital. As above, for computational convenience, we express the amount
of the subsidy as ts    sAsks(1 ) ; where ks is the equilibrium value
of ks:













Solving (4) and (5), we obtain
KFs(F) =











 [(1 +  s)] 1  As 1+   ; (6)
4Of course, the FOCs are well-dened out of equilibrium. We focus on their equilib-

























































  [(1 +  s)]
1
 
1 +    (1 +  s)
1 +  
; (8)
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 : (9)




























; as claimed above.




neJ (F) (Ui (:))  c
e
I ;
i.e., by direct computation, if and only if F

i; 


























 (1 +  s) 1  (1 +    (1 +  s))  ce0I ; (10)
















The equilibrium threshold value F is then obtained solving F





The following Proposition summarizes the fundamental properties of
the equilibria. The proof is in Appendix 1.
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Proposition 1. Given (A; ; ; ;  ; ), with  =  = 0; there is

C > 0






; there is an equilibrium with threshold value
F (:; ceI) 2 (0; 1) : Moreover, given (Ane; ; ; ) ; there is Ae such that,
for each Ae > Ae; at ( ; ) = 0; the equilibrium is unique, @F (:)
@F > 0 and
the equilibrium map F(:; ceI) satises
@F
@e je=0 < 0; @
F




In the sequel, we will mostly consider the leading case where @F (:)
@F > 0
at each equilibrium threshold: The crucial role of this condition is that it
guarantees that @
F
@e < 0 and
@F
@ne > 0; when evaluated at the equilibrium
without subsidies, so that the direct and indirect e¤ects of an increase in
ne work in the same direction, an empirically plausible restriction. Also,
notice that, if there is a threshold F1 where @F (:)
@F j1=F < 0; there
must also be (at least) one second (lower) equilibrium threshold, F2;
with @F (:)
@F j2=F > 0; because F (:) is continuous and F (0; 0; ceI) < 0:
Some considerations on the properties of the equilibrium allocations in
the two classes of economies (with and without frictions, and without taxes
and subsidies) may be of some interest. First, the physical/human capital






 = KWs (i)
HWs (i)














Evidently, the second term is always greater than one, for su¢ ciently small
i: This immediately implies that the frictionless equilibrium allocation is
not Pareto superior to the one of the economy with frictions: Agents with
a su¢ ciently low i are always better o¤ in the last one.
In the economy with frictions, the threshold value F can be either
lower or higher than its value in the Walrasian economy, as we establish
with the following example.
Example 1. Consider the economy with Ae = 2; Ane = 1;  =  =









W   ceI = 0

















F2   2F + 1   
F 23
1CA  ceI = 0
12
in the economy with frictions. One can verify that, for ceI < 0:019; 
F <
W, while, for ceI > 0:019; the opposite occurs: This is shown in Figure 1


































5. INEFFICIENCY PROPERTIES OF THE ECONOMY WITH
FRICTIONS
It is trivial to show that the equilibria of the economy with frictions
are Pareto ine¢ cient. More interesting is to analyze their ine¢ ciency in
terms of its e¤ects on the amount, and the type, of investments. In the
sequel, we will mainly refer to the investments in human capital. Similar
considerations hold for the ones in physical capital.
In our set-up, ine¢ ciencies can be of two di¤erent types. First, an
individual can choose an amount of investment di¤erent from the Pareto
optimal one, given the partition 
pI . We will refer to this possible source of
ine¢ ciency as underinvestment (or overinvestment) in educational e¤ort.
Secondly, an agent can choose to invest in a type of education di¤erent from
the one assigned to her at the (constrained) Pareto optimal allocation. We
will say that there is underinvestment in educational type when agent i
invests in education ne; while, at the CPO allocation, she should invest in
education level e:
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In the one-sector model, equilibria are unambiguously characterized by
underinvestment in educational e¤ort and in physical capital. In our set
up, the same e¤ect is at work: In each sector, given the equilibrium value
of F; an increase in the investment of rms and workers leads to a Pareto
improvement. The argument is identical to the one exploited by Acemoglu
(1996): Consider a small change in hsi and k
s
j ; each i and j. The changes in
utilities and producerssurplus evaluated at the equilibrium pair (hsi ; k
s
j )
(and taking into account that ksj = k












































respectively. The inequalities hold because the rst terms in parenthesis in





while the second terms are clearly positive. Hence, in each sector, there is
underinvestment in both educational e¤ort and physical capital.
In the two-sector case, there is a second potential source of ine¢ ciency,
because changes in the value of  may also entail Pareto improvements.
An increase in the threshold value  increases the conditional expected
amount of human capital in both sectors at the same time and, conse-
quently, induces an increase in the amount of physical investments of rms










> 0, for each s; (13)













> 0; each s: (14)














> 0; for each i: (15)
These properties do not su¢ ce to establish our claim, because a change
in the threshold induces a jump in the producers surplus for the rms
14
shifting from one sector to the other: However, as we will formally estab-
lish below (in Proposition 3), under suitable restrictions on the equilibria,
ex-post producers surplus of the rms matched with agents with their i
in some neighborhood of  are strictly positive in sector ne and negative
in sector e: Given the xed costs of education, the utility of the agent with
i = 
F is identical in the two sectors, so that the impact of the di¤erences
in utility levels is negligible. Therefore, for this subset of economies, su¢ -
ciently small increases of the threshold value are Pareto improving, because
of the "composition e¤ect".
To complete the analysis of the welfare properties of equilibria, it is
convenient to introduce an explicit notion of (constrained) e¢ ciency. As
usual in economies with frictions, we consider the metaphor of a benevolent
planner choosing an allocation while facing constraints aiming to capture
the ones (informational or of other nature) the agents face in the decen-
tralized economy. We provide two results. First, we show that there are
constrained Pareto optimal allocations (Proposition 2) and that they can
be attained with an appropriate system of taxes and subsidies. Secondly,
in Proposition 3, we study the e¤ects of taxes and subsidies taking as given
the demand/supply functions of the agents. We show that, at least for a
subset of economies, there are systems of taxes and subsidies which increase
the aggregate expected surplus.
Bear in mind that, in the sequel, we always consider changes in the
conditional expectation of the total surplus. We are not concerned with
actual Pareto improvements. However, given that utility functions are
quasi-linear, an increase of the expected total surplus immediately trans-
lates (modulo an appropriate system of lump-sum taxes and transfers) into
a Pareto improvement. Also, given the structure of the economy, it is easy
to check that our systems of taxes and transfers can actually be designed
so to guarantee a balanced budget.
5.1. Constrained Pareto e¢ cient allocations
The objective function of the planner is given by the sum of the condi-























































J and a pair of maps
(HCPOs (i; 
) ; KCPOs ()); where we restrict the partitions to have the
structure 
eI (
) = fi 2 
I ji  g ; and 
eJ () = fj 2 
J jj = i; i 2 
eI ()g :
Given that rms are (ex-ante) identical, and given the informational
constraints embedded into the denition of P 0 (:) ; and the properties of
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the (implicit) matching function, to impose this structure on 
pJ does not
entail any loss of generality. Given that the optimal choice ksj is j invariant
and that, by assumption,  (
sI (
)) =  (
sJ (
)) ; the planners objective
function can then be rewritten as















































sI ())  ks (
sJ ()) :
Its optimization problem is, then,
max
(hsi ;ks;)
P (hsi ; k
s; ) : (P)
It is convenient to decompose (P ) into three problems. First, given an arbi-



























sI ())  ks (
sJ ()) : (Ps)
Next, given the value functions P s() of the two problems (P s) ; s =
e; ne; we recast problem (P ) as
max

P ()  P e() + Pne(); (P 0)
nding the optimal value of ; CPO: Given that P s(); s = e; ne; is
a continuous function of , problem (P 0) has an optimal solution, either
interior or at one of the two boundary points f0; 1g. Hence, a constrained
Pareto optimal allocation exists.
Comparing the FOCs associated with the CPO allocation and the ones
associated with the equilibrium of the economy with frictions, we can im-
mediately establish that equilibria of the latter economy are constrained
Pareto ine¢ cient. The source of ine¢ ciency considered by Acemoglu (1996)
reappears in our set-up, because, given any threshold level ; HCPOs (i; )
> HFs (i; 
) ; and KCPOs () > KFs () : On the other hand, the re-
lation between the CPO value of the threshold, CPO; and its equilibrium
level, F; is not univocal. Example 2 in Appendix 1 shows two economies:
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the rst has CPO < F; the other CPO > F. This does not contra-
dict our previous claim (that an increase in F can be Pareto improving).
There, we were evaluating the reactions of rms and workers according to
their actual demand and supply functions. Here, the optimal value CPO is
determined using the demand/supply functions determined by the planner.
Proposition 2. Under the maintained assumptions, each economy with
frictions has a CPO allocation. Moreover, equilibrium allocations are never
CPO and they are characterized by underinvestment in the amount of phys-
ical capital and in educational e¤ort. Both under and overinvestments in
educational level are possible.
The details are in Appendix 1.
It is quite obvious that the CPO allocation can be implemented with
an appropriate system of subsidies to investments, and of xed taxes or
subsidies.
Corollary 1. There is a (balanced budget) system of taxes and subsi-
dies (c;cI ;  ; ) such that the associated equilibrium allocation is CPO.
5.2. Pareto improving taxes and subsidies
We conclude considering the welfare e¤ects of alternative, active human
capital policies. In particular, we consider the case of a general, non-linear,
tax/subsidy, (cI ; ts (hs)) :We show that, depending upon the sign of @F@F
(and provided that the threshold level F is not "too high"); distinct
subsets of policy instruments have unambiguous welfare improving e¤ects.
If @F
@F > 0 (a maintained assumption in the sequel); an increase in the
cost of education (redistributing the revenues as a lump-sum transfer), or
an increase of the subsidies to educational e¤ort in the "low skill" sector ne;
always increase expected total surplus. On the contrary, an increase in the
subsidy to investments in the high skill sector may decrease it. The (fairly
transparent) logic of these results is the following. When  is not "too
high", ex-post producer surplus is negative in sector e for  su¢ ciently
close to F; so that an increase in its value induces an improvement in
total social surplus. A subsidy tne (hne) has a direct, positive, e¤ect on
investments in education e¤ort in sector ne; and a positive, indirect, e¤ect
on the investment e¤ort in both sectors, because it induces an increase in
the equilibrium value of F: For the same reason, a tax on higher edu-
cation cI > 0 (whose revenue is redistributed using lump-sum transfers)
has an indirect, positive e¤ects on the investments in educational e¤ort in
both sectors. Therefore, they always lead (modulo a redistribution) to a
Pareto improvement. Given the structure of the preferences, we can always
combine the two policies so that the net budget cost is zero.
The third policy, making sector e more attractive to workers, induces
some workers with i < 
F to switch sector. This has an unambiguous,
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negative e¤ect on the welfare of the workers remaining in sector ne. More-
over, the negative e¤ect on the welfare of the workers in sector e; due to the
composition e¤ect, may overcome the positive e¤ect of the incentives on
the investments in educational e¤ort in this sector too, so that we may end
up with a lower expected total surplus. This is established in Proposition
3 and by a nal example.
Lets make the previous heuristic argument formal. Consider a plan-
ners optimization problem where we introduce explicit (anonymous) policy
instruments: a xed tax/subsidy on the type of education (denoted cI)
and a subsidy to the e¤ort in education: The problem of the planner is to
choose the values of (cI ; ) ; after that, workers and rms choose their in-
dividually optimal behavior. Hence, (omitting the superscript F whenever
is not useful) we dene the following planning problem


















































where the last term reects the fact that we redistribute equally across all
the workers the revenues of the xed tax cI , charged to the ones active








Proposition 3. Consider an equilibrium associated with (c;cI ; ) =
0 and such that @F
















i: (c;cI) with cI > 0; and su¢ ciently small, increases the ex-
pected total surplus,
ii: ne > 0; and su¢ ciently small, increases the expected total surplus,
iii: e > 0; and su¢ ciently small, may decrease the expected total sur-
plus.
The proof of statements (i; ii) is in Appendix 1, where we also establish
that the welfare e¤ect of a subsidy e is, in general, indeterminate. We now
provide a strategy to construct economies where an increase in e decreases
the total expected surplus. The third statement, therefore, is established
by the following example.
EXAMPLE 3. Welfare-reducing subsidies to investments in human
capital
Using (8) and (9) above, we can express the FOC of optimization prob-






























We need to construct an economy such that, at the equilibrium, @P (;c)@e <
0: The rst two terms of the expression above are clearly bounded above.
Hence, the result is established, if we can construct an equilibrium with
@P ()
@F bounded away from zero, and
@F
@e < 0 and arbitrarily large in
absolute value.
Consider rst @P ()
@F : In view of the proof of Proposition 3 in Appendix






















By (8) and (9), the term in brackets is positive and bounded away from
zero. Hence, @P ()
@F is bounded away from zero if   0: In the proof of















Pick a sequence of economies (parameterized by the value of Ae) such
that @F (:)





at (some of the equilibria of) the ones associated with Ae <
_
Ae: Notice
that, if @F (:)
@F > 0;
@F









; because the right hand side of (b)






  0 and, therefore, @P (t;c)
@F  ; for some  > 0: Choose ceI so that,
for each economy associated with Ae >
_
Ae; the threshold value satises
F  ; for some  > 0:
Consider now @
F


























is bounded away from zero for each F   > 0: On the other hand, by





each v; the associated sequence @F (A
ev)
@F converges to zero. Hence, we can
make j@F@e j arbitrarily large by choosing Ae >
_
Ae and su¢ ciently close to
_
Ae: Therefore, there are economies such that @P ()@e je=0 < 0:
6. CONCLUSIONS
We have extended the analysis of the externalities related to invest-
ments in human capital considering economies with two di¤erent types of
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human capital, and market imperfections. The most natural interpretation
of our model is in terms of college vs. high school education. Our results
partly conrm the conclusions of Acemoglu (1996). Labor market imper-
fections generate a positive externality of investments in educational e¤ort
and physical capital. However, in the two-sector case, there is a second
externality, due to the composition e¤ect and induced by the endogenous
workerschoice of the type of education to invest in. Under our assump-
tions, this externality has always a negative e¤ect on the investments: at
equilibrium, an increase in the measure of agents getting the higher type of
education has a negative e¤ect on the investments in physical capital and
educational e¤ort in both sectors. The e¤ects on welfare are somewhat
more ambiguous.
The one-sector and the two-sector models have sharply di¤erent conse-
quences in terms of policy prescriptions. In the rst kind of model, some
(possibly small) level of subsidies to investments is always Pareto improv-
ing. In the two-sector framework, on the contrary, it is crucial to select the
right combination of taxes and subsidies.
Our conclusions rest crucially on the assumption of random matching
taking place after the investments are selected. In economies with directed
search, they would obviously be di¤erent (see, for instance, Acemoglu and
Shimer (1999)).
7. APPENDIX 1: PROOFS OF THE PROPOSITIONS
Proof of Proposition 1. Pick the partition 
pI (
) induced by an
arbitrary : Assume that there is an agent i such that F (i0 ; ) = 0; so
that i0 = 
: Evidently, F (i; ) > 0 for each i >  and F (i; ) < 0
for each i < 



















I ji  F
o
; where F
is the (unique) threshold value:


































Evidently, both functions are continuous in the (arbitrarily selected) thresh-
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old value : With some abuse of notation, dene the function
F ()   1+  Ae 1+  
 


























s; is bounded, lim!0 F () < 0:



































; there is an interior equilibrium, whose threshold value F is given
by the solution to F () = 0:
Evidently, @F@ceI
< 0; and, by direct computation, for each s,
@F
@ s









(1 ) 1+   (1 +  ) (1  )
 
> 0:
Unfortunately, the sign of @F
@F depends upon the specic parameters of



























































: By direct computation,
ne () = (   1) ; while e () =  (1 )+(1 )(1 )(1 ) : With a straight-
forward manipulation, we obtain that
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from zero, the right hand side of the eq. above is always positive, for A
e
Ane
su¢ ciently large. Therefore, @F
@F > 0 at each equilibrium, for A
e large
enough. Evidently, given that F (0) < 0; if @F
@F > 0 at each solution to
F () = 0; the solution must be unique. Moreover, by the implicit function
theorem, @F
@F > 0 at each equilibrium also implies that 
F( ; ceI) satises
@F
@e je=0 < 0; @
F
@ne jne=0 > 0 and @
F
@ceI
> 0. Hence, to conclude the proof
we need two additional results:
Fact 1. e ()  0; at each  2 (0; 1) :
By direct computation, e (0) = 0 and e (1) =  12 > 0: Hence, either
there is  2 (0; 1) such that e () = 0 or e () > 0 for each  2 (0; 1) ; as
claimed.
Consider the numerator of e (), call it f () ;
f () =   (1  ) +  (1  ) :
Evidently, e () = 0 if and only if f() = 0:
Clearly, f (0) = f(1) = 0: Given that @f@ = 1   2 1 +
 
2   1  ;
@f





2   1  1 2 (   1)  2 =
 (   1) > 0; so that  = 1 is a local minimum of f () : This implies that,
if there is a 0 2 (0; 1) such that f  0 = 0; there must also be a " 2
(0; 1) such that f (") = 0 and @f@ j=" > 0: Given that, by assumption,
" 2 (0; 1) ; " 6= 0; and, therefore, f(")" = 0; and

@f






j="   f (")
"
=  2" 1 +  2   1 " + " 1 (1  ") + "
=
 
   2 (1  ") " 1 < 0;
because  > 1: Hence, f() > 0 and therefore  () > 0; at each  2
(0; 1).







: Then, G () > 1; for each  2
(0; 1) :
Given that  > 1; the result is quite obvious. Using Taylors expansion,
for each  2 (0; 1) ; we can write  = 1 +  0 1 (   1) ; for some




 for some " 2 (0; ) : Hence,
G () = 
0 1





EXAMPLE 1. The following example shows that it can actually be
the case that @F
@F < 0: Assume that  =
1
2 ;  = 10; A
ne = 1; Ae = 11=10:
Then, by direct computation,





























@ strictly positive for 
 su¢ ciently small, and negative for all
 larger than some critical value +: For instance, one can check that
lim!1
@F (;:)
@ <  0:003: Obviously, by choosing appropriately ceI ; every
 can be made to become the equilibrium F.
Proof of Proposition 2. Given that optimization problem (P s) is


















s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sI(
) di = 0;
which imply






































It follows that KCPOs () > KFs() and HCPO (i; ) > HFs (i; ) ;
for each value : Therefore, equilibria are always characterized by under-
investment in physical capital and in the e¤ort in education.
Demand and supply functions are clearly well-dened and continuous at
each  2 (0; 1) and P s() has the same properties: Hence, problem (P 0)
has a solution, either internal or at one of the boundary points, and, there-
fore, CPO allocations exist.
Compare a market allocation and any CPO allocation. If they have the
same threshold value ; KCPOs () 6= KFs() and the market allocation
is not CPO. Otherwise, the threshold values are di¤erent, and constrained
Pareto ine¢ ciency follows immediately.
EXAMPLE 2. By tedious computation, one can verify that CPO
is the solution to
1 +  

















































































It is easy to construct economies with CPO > F and with F <




8 : Then, the
















































For Ae = 2; CPO = 0:18290 while F = 0:00643: At Ae = 1310 ; 
CPO =
0:39928; while F = 0:57283:











































































































































tion of the tax revenues. By denition of F; the rst term in brackets
is zero. We have already established that the last two terms are positive.
Hence, @P (;c)

























































































1+     F 1+ 1+  
!!
;







> 0 and @
F
@ne > 0; so that
@P (;c)
@ne > 0 and
@P (;c)
@ceI
> 0: It follows that a subsidy to education e¤ort in sector ne;
and/or an increase in the xed cost of education ceI ; increase the expected
total surplus .
On the other hand, @
F




8. APPENDIX 2: COMPETITIVE SPOT LABOR MARKETS
We use the same notation as above. We start solving for the ex-post
competitive equilibrium, contingent on the amount of investments in phys-
ical capital. A straightforward computation shows that the equilibrium















; and the invest-



















































j   ksj ;
25
with, j-invariant, optimal solution
Ks() =

(1 +  ) (1  )






























































































































Modulo the product by a positive scalar, this is the condition F () = 0 in
the text. Evidently, the qualitative properties of the equilibria are identical.
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